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Similar to the metamorphosis of most of our media of expression, the
motion picture has survived the uncertainty and novelty of infancy, the dim
promise of adolescence, and at present seems to have achieved the im-
pregnability of a sound maturity. Recognition of its growth as a praise-
worthy vehicle of the arts has not, however, paralleled its meteoric develop-
ment as an industry. Initially the "kinescope" was examined as a toy,
capable of furnishing entertainment, and considered limited in potential.
Gradually, almost imperceptibly, did the medium improve functionally,
command attention resolutely, and clothe itself ultimately with the armor of
the first amendment. This armor has not gone untested in the judicial
arena. Often has it been summoned forth, intricately tried, once pierced,
and finally nominated the victor. It is, however, these jousts and their
effects which perplex legal writers. For they manifest the possibility that
the motion picture, as a medium of expression, does not merit first amend-
ment status as fully as do speech and the press.1 It is not surprising then,
that conflicting solutions, ranging from license to general censorship,
should be proffered. Nor is it surprising to learn that the currently suc-
cessful solution stands midway between the extremes. An unequivocal
answer, which, as will appear, seems imminent, must not be sought in this
Comment. Its purpose will have been achieved if the difficulties confront-
ing the censor in his effort to curtail the license of the motion picture, are
presented lucidly and completely.
I.
THE PAST.
The invention of printing in the fifteenth century, and its subsequent
rapid development, unveiled promising vistas for the dissemination of ideas.
Though immediately recognized as a boon to the advancement of learn-
ing, the potentialities of this new invention troubled the ruling authorities.
Its progress was viewed with quiet suspicion. Thus almost inevitably, and
as a protective measure, arose the framework of a controlled press. In
1. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (dictum) ; Hallmark Productions
v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 350, 121 A.2d 584, 586 (1956) (dictum); 4 CATHOLIC U.L.
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England, from which evolved our doctrine of prior restraint, "printing
developed under royal sponsorship, and soon became a monopoly to be
granted by the Crown." 2 During the Age of Faith, the focal points of
suppression were blasphemy and heresy. With the advent of the Reforma-
tion, and the emergence of the state as the absolute power, attention was
directed toward treason and sedition, and the advantages offered to each
by a free press. The censor's preoccupation with obscenity did not com-
mence until the reign of Queen Victoria, not long after the first murmurs
of the Industrial Revolution.8 Thus, it can be seen that the interests, or
more accurately, the apprehensions of those in power determined that
which was to become the subject matter of censorship.
With immense relief did England experience the lapse of her censorship
statutes in 1695. The words of Blackstone capture the prevailing sentiment.
"In this and the other instances which we have lately considered, where
blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandal-
ous libels are punished by the English law, some with a greater, others
with a less degree of severity; the liberty of the press, properly under-
stood, is by no means infringed or violated. The liberty of the press is
indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying
no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to
forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the conse-
quences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive
power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the
revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of
one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all con-
troverted points in learning, religion, and government." 4
It was, of course, considered that the modes of expression would remain
static. But such has not been the course of events, and the emergence of
new media has surrounded attempts at control with equally new problems.
Of necessity, the motion picture did not, and has not invoked the "statute
of limitations" as to obscenity which is enjoyed by the literary classics. 5
Nor was there much concern over early state and local suppression of films
whatever be the basis of condemnation. A new and attractive influence had
entered the community, and a realization of its potentiality for evil en-
couraged controlling legislation. Eventually, what had already commenced
with unapprehensive confidence received the blessing of the Supreme Court
in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, wherein the ex-
2. Emerson, 20 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 648, 650 (1955).
3. Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47, 53 (1953) (dictum).
4. 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *151, *152.
5. Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47, 53 (1953).
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hibition of motion pictures was characterized as a "business, pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit." " In response to the novel
contention that as a medium of free speech, motion pictures should not be
shackled to the censor,7 the court held movies are not a part of the press of
the country, nor are they an organ of public opinion.
s
During the thirty-seven years in which the movie industry was await-
ing its emancipation, the judiciary was busied with problems created by
another media of expression, the press, which was struggling to shake off
the burdens of legislative interference. This period evinces the develop-
ment of those principles which were to rescue the cause of freedom for the
movies; but it also marks an era to which one might profitably resort in
seeking to determine the possibility of a legislature's successfully fashioning
a censorship statute. In an opinion read by Chief Justice Hughes the
Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota condemned previous restraint of the
press as unconstitutional.9 In Grosjean v. American Press Co., a tax upon
newspapers computed on the basis of circulation was held an abridgement
of the freedom of the press, and inimical to an informed public opinion
which is "the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment." 10
The newspaper had been granted its freedom. The novel was con-
fronted with difficulties of another nature. Obscenity became the pitfall
of numerous literary attempts, and in the process of their examination before
the bar, the antiquated test enunciated in Regina v. Hicklin," surrendered
to the rule laid down by Judge Hand in the leading case of United States v.
Ulysses.'2 Then was born l'homme moyen sensuel, Who has since been con-
sulted in the determination of that which is obscene. Therein was fashioned
the judgment as a whole theory; and there is promulgated the "statute of
limitations" as to the classics.
"In applying this test, relevancy of the objectionable parts to the theme,
the established reputation of the work in the estimation of approved
critics, if the work is modern, and the verdict of the past, if it is ancient,
are persuasive pieces of evidence; for works of art are not likely to
sustain a high position with no better warrant for their existence than
their obscene content." 13
6. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
7. Previously the usual attack upon movie censorship statutes was upon the basis
of unlawful discrimination and the taking of property without due process of law.
E.g., Block v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N.E. 1011 (1909).
8. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
9. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1937).
10. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
11. "The test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral in.
fluences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." 3 Q.B. 360, 371
(1868).
12. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
13. Id. at 708.
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Thus while the cinema labored under the lash of the censor, two tenets of
the law were moulded; one of which was to lead to emancipation, the other,
namely the evolution of the word obscenity and supplementary words as
satisfactory statutory standards, which could be employed to revive the
reign of the censor.
II.
THE PRESEIT.
Burstyn v. Wilson held that expression by means of motion pictures
is included within the free speech and free press guarantees of the first and
fourteenth amendments, 14 thus overruling Mutual Films, which had denied
this status to motion pictures. Though this would indicate that all further
conjecture on the matter might more profitably be directed elsewhere, the
decision has not, for reasons within the opinion itself, provoked such a
pessimistic outlook. The Court explained that although the purpose of the
first amendment guarantee of a free press was calculated to prevent prior
restraints upon publications, exceptional cases could justify the imposition
of a clearly drawn censorship statute. 15 Questions of the constitutionality
of such a statute directed against obscenity were specifically left open.',
The implications of this omission become more pertinent when it is recalled
that the basis for declaring the New York statute invalid was the vagueness
of the standard "sacrilegious," 17 whereas it must have been apparent to the
Court that the word "obscene" embodies a standard sufficiently certain
to satisfy due process requirements.' 8
With the favor bestowed upon the cinema as a precedent, other forms
of the entertainment world sought refuge from the eye of the censor. The
theatre and television were afforded the protection previously limited to
speech and the press.19 The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that bur-
lesque "is a form of speech and prima facie expression protected by the
State and Federal Constitutions." 20 However, the court was alert to limit
the protection to legitimate burlesque as opposed to modern burlesque, the
operator of which "knows, and everything in his theatre indicates he knows,
14. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
15. Id. at 502, 503; 49 Nw. U.L. Rmv. 390 (1954); 102 U. PA. L. REv. 671 (1954).
16. See, Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; American Civil Liberties Union
v. Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954) ; 4 CATHOLIc U.L. Rv. 112 (1954)
30 IND. L.J. 462 (1955).
17. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; United Artists Corp. v. Maryland
State Board of Censors, 124 A.2d 292 (Md. 1956).
18. Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896) ; Burstein v. United States,
178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1950) ; New American Library of World Literature v. Allen,
114 F.Supp. 823 (,N.D. Ohio 1953); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.
1930) ; United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F.Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951) ; Brown
v. Kingsley Books, 151 N.Y.S.2d 639, 134 N.E.2d 461 (1956) ; Commonwealth v. Isen-
stadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945). Contra, Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J.
Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47, 55 (1953) (dictum).
19. Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Adams
Theatre Co., v. Keenan, 12 ,N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519 (1953).
20. Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519, 520 (1953).
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that he is giving a sex show, sans excuses, sans philosophy and above all
sans clothes. He is in that sense a professional purveyor of sex." 21
In contrast to the success enjoyed by these media of entertainment
within the Supreme Court, has been the consistent failure of the state
legislatures to fashion a sound censorship statute. Each effort has met
with failure, but in the form of a pronouncement which, like the Burstyn
decision, seemed to point the way toward possible success. The words used,
not the method employed, has been the turning point. This is by no means
an approval of censorship, for it might as easily be interpreted as the absence
of any reason on the part of the Court to examine the method, due to the
patent constitutional shortcoming; or, more optimistically, as a determina-
tion "that the particular films involved did not possess those qualities which
would justify censorship." 22 Still, in view of the feasibility of a precise
statute alluded to in the Burstyn decision, it is deduced that censorship of
movies is not per se invalid.23 But the area in which the censor remains
operative has been steadily delimited.2 4 Presently a censorship statute may
not embody as a standard, "sacrilegious," 25 "prejudicial to the best inter-
ests of the people," 20 "immoral and harmful," 27 "immoral, tending to cor-
rupt morals." 28  Following this pattern, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
in Hallmark Productions v. Carroll, somewhat reluctantly struck down its
censorship statute, holding "indecent, immoral, tending to debase and cor-
rupt morals" as unconstitutionally void for vagueness.2 9 The Pennsylvania
Legislature immediately responded to this decision by rushing a proposed
amendment to the floor of the General Assembly.3 0 The bill provides that
it shall be "unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion-picture,
film, reel or view in Pennsylvania which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy
or vile." 31 Fully manifest within the bill is the crippling effect of Hall-
mark. There is retained the Board of Censors, but it has lapsed into an
office which has been stripped of most of its former powers. Included is
a section authorizing board disapproval with subsequent notice to the
offending exhibitor, but the concrete effects of such disapproval seem un-
21. Id. at 523.
22. American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585, 589
(1954).
23. 42 CALP. L. R.v. 122 (1954) ; 30 IND. L.J. 462 (1955).
24. 42 CALIv. L. Rsv. 122 (1954); 3 D& PAUL L. Rev. 227 (1954).
25. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
26. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
27. Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
28. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
29. Hallmark Productions v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
30. PA. H. 675, read in the Senate on March 26, 1956, proposed to amend the
Pa. Censorship Act of 1915. Deleted from the Act was a provision making it unlaw-
ful to exhibit a film unless submitted and duly approved by the Pa. State Board of
Censors. Of particular interest are the requirements of Section 24 of the proposal pro-
viding for registration of each person who intends to sell, lease exhibit or use any
film reel, and requiring notice to the Board at least forty-eight hours before exhibi-
tion.
31. PA. H. 675, Sec. 2, Sess. of 1955.
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clear.8 2 In substance, and except for one section,33 the proposal smacks of
an effort to stem any influx of objectionable films by the constitutionally
approved method of subsequent punishment, as opposed to the former prior
restraint.
Thus in a manner similar to the evolution of legislative attempts to
control objectionable literature, the censor has been deprived of many of
his most treasured weapons by the rule of void for vagueness. Hope for
amelioration of this rule seems futile. His alternative points to a continued
search for adequate standards. Should he reflect upon those thirty-seven
years during which he controlled the motion picture, he would find that not
all standards employed have failed. The adventures of the novel before the
various state and federal courts reveal a basis upon which censorship stat-
utes can be fashioned which should surmount the frustrating void for vague-
ness barrier. An analysis of the cases from Regina v. Hicklin,8 4 to the
astute opinion of Justice Hand in Ulysses 85 would remind him that in sub-
sequent forays into the Supreme Court under the banner of censorship, he
should arm himself with a weapon directed specifically against obscenity.
III.
THE FUTURE.
Circumstances indicate that the threshold of invoking an unequivocal
answer as to whether censorship of films on the basis of obscenity is con-
stitutional has been attained. Of particular significance in this respect is
Brown v. Kingsley Book Co.,36 wherein the New York Court of Appeals
examined, in the light of constitutional restraints, the efforts of the legis-
lature to augment the penal statute against obscenity, by devising an equi-
table action by way of injunction. The court seems acutely concerned with
minimizing the similarity between prior restraint and the injunctive process
contained in the statute in issue. However, the very author from which
the court has gathered much of its information on the topic offers as his
second example of prior restraint, "injunction or similar judicial process
enforced through a contempt proceeding." 7 As would be expected, the
case of Near v. Minnesota,38 is discussed in the majority opinion. The
apparent purpose of counsel for the defendant's allusion to this case, is
32. While the prior law made continued exhibition after Board disapproval unlaw-
ful, it is not clear that a similar sanction has been retained in the proposal.
33. PA. H. 675, Sec. 20: "Any duly authorized employe of the board may enter any
place where films reels or views are exhibited and such employe is hereby empowered
and authorized to prevent the display or exhibition of any film reel or view or part or
parts thereof which has been disapproved by the board."
34. (1868) 3 Q.B. 360.
35. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
36. 151N.Y.S.2d 639, 134 N.E.2d461 (1956). Of collateral interest concerning the
case is the fact that one Jack Koslow, one of Brooklyn's juvenile "thrill-killers" of
a few years ago, was an avid reader of the sadistic-type publication against which the
injunction proceedings were brought. N.Y. Joint Leg. Committee to Study the Pub-
lication of Comics Rep., Leg. Doe. 37, 14 (1955).
37. Emerson, 20 LAW & CONTEM. PROB., 648, 655 (1955). The author lists as other
examples of prior restraint, licensing, laws, motion picture censorship, registration of
lobbyists or political organizations.
38. 283 U.S. 697 (1937).
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to indicate the Supreme Court's view that prior censorship is "abhorrent
to our traditions." 39 .Ignoring a sparkling'opportunity to distinguish on
the basis that the issue of prior restraint statutes directed against obscenity
has been specifically left open by the Court, the opinion contents itself with
distinguishing on the mechanics and scope of the Minnesota statute.40 It
would seem -that the solution to the primary and only issue presented by
the case is concisely stated by Judge Desmond in a-manner in which the
Supreme Court could well interpret the majority opinion.
"Answering the one argument made to us, we hold on most ample
authority that the First Amendment does not protect obscene books
against prior restraint." 41
When confronted with-a similar statute, the Supreme Court of -Illinois
in American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, ruled that censorship on the
basis of obscenity is not offensive to the Constitution, and that Supreme
Court decisions in the area are not to be interpretedas invalidating all film
censorship.4 Dicta within this case offers valuable advice concerning ap-
pellate provisions within censorship statutes.
"We think, therefore, that upon -review of -the censor's action, the
plaintiff does not carry a burden of proving that that-action was arbi-
trary and unreasonable, but rather that it must affirmatively be made
to appear that the film fairly falls within the proscriptive 'terms of
the ordinance." 43
CONCLusIoN.
It would be neither wise, nor of any particular value to attempt a
prediction as to the Supreme Court's reaction to a censorship statute under
circumstances wherein the void for vagueness rule is not available. How-
ever, this timidity is not shared by all, some of whom conclude that a state's
interest in morality, and the evil caused by objectionable films is not suffi-
cient to justify legislative invasion in the realm of free speech as examined
under the clear and present danger test.4 4 This is an issue of the purest
conjecture, particularly in view of the paucity of informative precedents.
The consoling aspect of the problem is that its solution appears to be
imminent. And the stimulus which could readily precipitate an unequivocal
answer is glowingly illustrated in the Illinois and New York statutes
currently authorizing censorship.
John J. Collins
39. Hannegan v. Esquire Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 151 (1946).
40. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 151 N.Y.S.2d 639, 134 N.E.2d 461 (1956).
41. Id. at 648 (Concurring opinion, Desmond J.).
42. American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954).
43. Id. at 594.
44. 18 ALBANY L. Rev. 47 (1954); 49 .Nw. U.L. Rnv. 390 (1954). But see, Brown
v. Kingsley Books, 151 N.Y.S.2d 639, 134 N.E.2d 461 (1956); 30 NOTRE DAME LAW.
469 (1955) ; 4 WES RN Rgs. L. REv. 148 (1953). The current clear and present danger
test as ennunciated in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), examines the
statute from the standpoint of whether the evil sought to be avoided thereby, discounted
by its improbability, is such as will justify an invasion of free speech or press to the
extent necessary to effect its avoidance.
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